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A few decades ago, there was little interest in diasporas and their politics beyond a few “classic” cases such as the Jewish or Arme-
nian diasporas. Today, diaspora politics—forms of 
political engagement that link constituencies in 
one country with a real or imagined “homeland” 
somewhere else—are omnipresent, part and parcel 
of everyday politics around the world. Diasporas 
are being courted by state policy makers, heralded 
by international organizations such as the World 
Bank, and increasingly seen as influential global 
actors. Why?
Part of the answer lies in larger changes associ-
ated with globalization. Many of the same forces 
that have contributed to a rise in international mi-
gration—such as structural changes in the global 
economy, enhanced global connectivity, and the 
search for a better life—have also facilitated forms 
of diasporic political engagement that traverse 
state borders. 
New technologies and the rise of global media 
and communications allow dispersed populations 
to engage in transnational politics in real time. 
This allows them to influence political events 
in ways that have attracted the attention of both 
governments and non-state actors—such as po-
litical parties and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs).
Diasporic networks that connect populations 
across different nation-states can be used to facili-
tate the cross-border transfer of resources, skills, 
ideas, and influence. Being positioned in such ad-
vantageous ways gives them political power.
At the same time, the basic features of dias-
pora politics—of populations living in one coun-
try and engaging transnationally with the poli-
tics of another—are certainly not entirely new. In 
the United States in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, many migrants maintained 
close ties with their countries of origin, sending 
remittances or participating in homeland politi-
cal movements. 
Groups such as the Irish nationalist Fenians 
organized in the United States to oppose Brit-
ish rule in Ireland; overseas Chinese communi-
ties on the West Coast of the United States and 
Canada were called on to support the 1911 Revo-
lution in China; and Czechs and Slovaks in the 
United States were the driving force behind the 
establishment of Czechoslovakia as an indepen-
dent state in 1918, following the collapse of the 
Habsburg Empire. Italians who migrated to the 
United States in the early twentieth century were 
so closely connected to Italy that they were often 
referred to as “birds of passage”—large numbers 
of them made frequent trips back and forth, sent 
remittances in the form of money and care pack-
ages to family members left behind, or eventually 
returned home.
In fact, much of what is thought of today as di-
aspora politics has been studied and understood 
in the past under different labels—as immigrant 
or ethnic politics, “ethnic lobbying,” or emigrant, 
exile, or expatriate politics. In the United States, 
Cuban-American, Irish-American, and Polish-
American organizations have all participated in 
US domestic politics, formed interest groups, and 
lobbied on behalf of their communities, but also 
for causes and policies related to their respective 
countries of origin. What has changed over time 
is the conceptual frame used to understand such 
politics, as well as the ways they intersect with 
other features of globalization.




“[D]iaspora politics can be viewed as not only enhancing or challenging state power in particular cases,  
but also contributing to new forms of global identity politics that transcend state institutions.”
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WHAT IS A DIASPORA?
The above examples raise the question of what 
exactly is meant by the term “diaspora.” How are 
diasporas different from immigrants, refugees, ex-
patriates, transnational ethnic groups, exiles, emi-
grés, or transnational or overseas communities? 
Do Americans abroad constitute a diaspora? What 
about Mexicans living in the United States? Are 
Asian-Americans also members of Chinese, Ko-
rean, Cambodian, Vietnamese, or other diasporas? 
And does a shared religious or sectarian identity 
constitute a diaspora? It is common parlance to 
speak of a global Jewish diaspora, but can we speak 
of Hindu, Yazidi, Coptic, Zoroastrian, Catholic, or 
Muslim diasporas?
The answers to these questions are not obvious 
and, indeed, scholars have spilled much ink de-
bating what constitutes a diaspora. In some earlier 
accounts, forced dispersal from a homeland and 
the associated trauma of exile were considered to 
be important elements—as in the examples of the 
Jewish and Armenian diasporas. Yet in contempo-
rary usage the notion of a diaspora has taken on a 
broader meaning. It is often used as shorthand for 
any transnational group that maintains a sense of 
national or ethnic collective identity by cultivating 
strong ties with each other and with their real or 
imagined homeland.
Some have suggested that the “world of diaspo-
ras” is composed of different types based on the 
original causes of dispersal. Robin Cohen of Oxford 
University has proposed a typology of diasporas 
based on the categories “victim” (such as the Jews 
and Armenians), “trade” (Chinese and Lebanese), 
“imperial” (British), and “labor” (indentured Indi-
ans). Others have identified “conflict-generated” 
or “refugee” diasporas (Tamils and Syrians, for ex-
ample). 
Such classifications present an oversimplified 
picture because they suggest that diasporas exist 
as homogeneous groups. They also ignore the fact 
that many forms of dispersal come about due to a 
mix of types of migration and motivations for mi-
grating. For example, the Turkish and Kurdish-or-
igin populations that live in Europe today include 
immigrants (and their descendents) who left their 
home countries as a result of state-sponsored labor 
migration, family reunification, political exile and 
expulsion, and irregular migration, as well as oth-
ers such as mobile business elites and students.
Furthermore, as the sociologist Rogers Brubak-
er has noted, there are cases in which a diaspora 
emerges not from “people crossing borders” but 
rather from “borders crossing people.” In the lat-
ter case, a group becomes dispersed when politi-
cal boundaries are drawn or redrawn, as when 
empires collapse and new states are created. The 
collapses of the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Soviet 
empires all produced examples of this kind of “di-
aspora formation,” including Hungarians living in 
Romania; Kurdish populations spread across Tur-
key, Iraq, and Syria; and Russians “stranded” in 
Estonia and Latvia.
An individual’s sense of belonging to a par-
ticular ethnic, national, or religious group is of-
ten quite subjective, however. Indeed, it can vary 
over time and across space. It is this element that 
complicates attempts to pin down the definition 
of diaspora, since attachment to a real or imagined 
homeland is difficult to measure and subject to 
change. Not all those who migrate from one place 
to another maintain a strong connection with the 
place they left. And yet, many people can feel a 
strong personal, emotional, and political identifi-
cation with a real or imagined homeland that they 
have never lived in or even set foot in—some di-
aspora activists are several generations removed 
from their “homeland.”
This means that definitions of diaspora that 
rely only on ethnicity or national origin can be 
misleading or problematic. They essentialize a 
group based on a particular category and ignore 
the larger political context, including the internal 
politics and differences that help explain how dia-
sporic identities are formed and maintained—and 
also why they fade away or become insignificant. 
What is more interesting than agreeing on a defi-
nition is to examine the politics surrounding the 
idea of a diaspora. When and why is the language 
of diaspora used by different actors? What does 
it mean to invoke the category of “diaspora” and 
when does it become politically salient?
This is important because there are many cases 
in which a change in politics appears to “awaken” 
a diaspora or, alternatively, causes the reverse to 
occur—when a diaspora appears to become “dor-
mant.” The 2011 Arab uprisings, for example, pro-
duced a flurry of diasporic political engagement by 
populations that had connections to countries such 
as Egypt, Tunisia, or Libya, but who may not have 
previously viewed themselves as part of a diaspora. 
Similarly, the level and nature of Irish-Americans’ 
political involvement with their “homeland” shift-
ed dramatically over time. Whereas Irish commu-
nities in the United States contributed to groups 
such as the Irish Northern Aid Committee during 
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the height of the Troubles in the 1970s and 80s, 
the Northern Ireland peace process of the 1990s 
led to a general depoliticization and weakening of 
these diasporic attachments.
COMPETING CLAIMS
Diaspora politics—like all other forms of poli-
tics—cannot be understood apart from the larger 
configurations of power and interests from which 
they emerge. These may include politics within 
the so-called home country, but also the politics of 
the country of residence, the broader geopolitical 
context (including the interests of international 
organizations or third-party states), and, impor-
tantly, politics within the diaspora itself. Some 
would argue that any manifestation of a diaspora 
is a political phenomenon. 
Invoking the term “diaspora” can be politically 
useful for a range of different types of actors. Indi-
viduals or organizations who claim the authority 
to speak on behalf of a diaspora can be seen as 
representing an influential con-
stituency. They may gain access 
to policy circles, resources, and 
networks in both their country 
of residence and their “home-
land,” as well as increasing their 
status within the group they are 
seeking to represent.
Diaspora politics is therefore 
often as much about who represents or claims to 
speak for the diaspora as it is about the political 
demands being made. In some cases there may be 
intense competition for the role of the legitimate 
“voice” of the diaspora, often based on political 
configurations back “home.” Old political rival-
ries and competition may be transplanted into, 
reemerge, or transform in new contexts. The Er-
itrean diaspora, for example, is strongly divided 
between government loyalists and various oppo-
sition groups—divisions that can be traced back 
to the struggle for independence from Ethio-
pia that took place from the 1960s through the 
1980s, and have persisted since Eritrea achieved 
independence in 1993.
A well-connected individual who claims to 
represent diaspora interests can have a dispropor-
tionate influence when conditions are ripe. For 
example, Ahmed Chalabi, who founded the Iraqi 
National Congress opposition group in the 1990s 
and had close personal connections with neocon-
servatives within the US government, played a key 
role in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
including feeding intelligence to the US and Brit-
ish governments that was later deemed to be bo-
gus. By claiming to represent the will of the Iraqi 
people in the diaspora, he helped legitimize the 
toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Strategies designed to mobilize a transnational 
constituency by delineating its members as a di-
aspora can be an effective means of engaging in 
political battles in the so-called homeland. For 
example, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in-
surgent group in Turkey placed a great deal of 
emphasis on fostering a sense of a distinct Kurd-
ish diaspora in Germany in the 1990s among the 
broader community of migrants from Turkey and 
their descendants. This included promoting Kurd-
ish language and culture, and setting up Kurdish 
media and political structures, in order to develop 
a national identity and set of political loyalties that 
competed with those offered by either the German 
or Turkish states.
COVETED RESOURCE
It is not surprising that in-
creasingly many states are 
seeking to secure a political 
advantage by engaging with or 
managing “their” diaspora. In 
a globalized world, this gives 
states an additional source of 
power and a sphere of influence 
that extends beyond the physical borders of the 
nation. Once shunned or ignored by policy mak-
ers, many diasporas are now viewed by state actors 
as potential sources of revenue and investment, as 
lobby groups for promoting state interests abroad, 
or as ambassadors that can facilitate bilateral trad-
ing relationships.
States are formulating official engagement poli-
cies to connect with populations around the world 
that could be considered diasporas. These can be 
citizens who live abroad or populations that have 
historical, linguistic, or other connections that 
could be activated. For example, India uses the 
category of Non-Resident Indian for citizens living 
abroad and the term Person of Indian Origin (PIO) 
for those of Indian origin or ancestry residing else-
where, excluding citizens of neighboring South 
Asian nations including Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
and Sri Lanka. PIOs can include people up to four 
generations removed from India. South Korea has 
different policies toward members of its diaspora 
based on location—treating Korean populations in 
the United States differently from those in China. 
New technologies allow  
dispersed populations to  
engage in transnational  
politics in real time.
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In some cases, two different states can compete 
for the loyalties of the same population. South and 
North Korea have both directed policies toward 
the Zainichi, or Korean population in Japan, while 
China and Taiwan have competed for influence 
among overseas Chinese.
Official state diaspora policies can include set-
ting up special ministries or forms of represen-
tation for overseas populations. For example, in 
2010 France created eleven overseas constituen-
cies that allowed French expatriates to elect their 
own representatives to the National Assembly. In 
the same year, Turkey established an Office for 
Turks Abroad and Related Communities that was 
designed to consolidate its ties with populations 
such as Turkish citizens or their descendants in 
Europe—groups that Turkey had historically en-
gaged with through its embassies and consulates 
or by sending religious clerics abroad via its Di-
rectorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet).
By granting dual citizenship and promoting 
direct investment opportunities to a global dias-
pora, states can tap into the 
resources and social capital 
of transnational constitu-
encies beyond the borders 
of the nation. This can be a 
valuable source of foreign 
investment. In 2015, annual 
global remittances amounted 
to around $600 billion, and in some countries 
they constitute more than 50 percent of gross 
domestic product. It is no wonder that organiza-
tions such as the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration have been pro-
moting diasporas as important actors for global 
economic growth. India, Mexico, and many oth-
er countries have devised policies that encourage 
remittances and use them to fund development 
projects. Mexico’s 3x1 program, for example, 
links grassroots hometown associations in the 
diaspora with local infrastructure projects, offer-
ing matching government funds as an incentive 
for emigrants to contribute.
Mobilized diaspora populations can also be 
used to promote a nation’s interests abroad. States 
can enhance and extend their power by courting 
diaspora organizations and encouraging them to 
engage in lobbying and public diplomacy—a post-
modern form of traditional power politics. Effec-
tive models of political lobbying by one group form 
the basis for other groups’ strategies. In the United 
States, the American Israel Public Affairs Commit-
tee (AIPAC) is often cited as a successful model of 
an effective lobby group, and it has been studied 
and emulated. For example, the United States In-
dia Political Action Committee was established in 
2002 following the AIPAC model, and was credited 
with successfully lobbying the US Congress to pass 
the US-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agree-
ment in 2008. 
More recently, the negative political rhetoric 
toward Mexico and Mexicans emanating from 
Donald Trump’s 2016 US presidential campaign 
prompted the establishment of the American 
Mexican Public Affairs Committee as a means 
of enhancing the image of Mexico and Mexican-
Americans. Again, AIPAC was seen as a model for 
the organization, and a number of Jewish organi-
zations have formed political alliances with Mex-
ican-Americans and are providing advice on how 
to publicly respond to toxic rhetoric and political 
attacks.
Some political observers have expressed con-
cern that such lobbying groups can undermine the 
ability of governments to for-
mulate foreign policies based 
on the national interest. Oth-
ers argue that this concern 
rests on a particular view of 
the national interest and does 
not necessarily represent the 
realities of contemporary pol-
icy making in an interdependent world. Many na-
tional interests are already transnational or global, 
due to factors such as the globalization of finance, 
trade, and investment, as well as challenges such 
as climate change or terrorism that transcend the 
territorial confines of states. 
Just as states can reach out to “their” diaspo-
ras overseas as a way of enhancing their power, 
governments of the countries in which diaspora 
groups reside can also leverage these transnation-
al connections for their own purposes. Govern-
ment ministries and agencies such as the United 
States Agency for International Development, 
the United Kingdom’s Department for Interna-
tional Development, and Germany’s Agency for 
International Cooperation have all worked with 
domestic diaspora groups to cooperate on over-
seas investment, philanthropy, and development. 
By treating remittances as a form of foreign aid, 
states can channel transnational financial flows 
in ways that enhance their status as significant 
players in the arena of international economic 
development.
Some diaspora activists are  
several generations removed  
from their “homeland.”
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REMOTE CONTROL
Diaspora politics provide many opportunities 
for diverse sets of actors, but they also have their 
downsides. For example, there is a fine line be-
tween a government embracing its diaspora and 
exploiting it for remittances or taxes. The exten-
sion of voting rights to a country’s citizens living 
abroad is usually viewed as a progressive move, 
but it can also be a way of monitoring or control-
ling them—as when authoritarian states have en-
couraged overseas citizens to register with embas-
sies in order to participate in largely uncontested 
elections. States can employ diaspora engagement 
policies as a means of surveilling overseas citizens 
and repressing activists and opposition groups 
operating abroad. In an age of digital media and 
online activism, this leads to new forms of trans-
national state repression that extend the reach and 
control of a regime beyond its national borders. 
Governments’ diaspora engagement policies 
can also be viewed by some as interfering in the 
domestic political life of other nations. Following 
the July 2016 military coup attempt in Turkey, a 
German court put restrictions on who could speak 
remotely to crowds at public demonstrations and 
prohibited a video-link appearance by Turkish 
President Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an at a rally held in 
Germany. But it is not just the German state and 
its institutions that may have problems with the 
transnational reach of the Turkish state—many 
German citizens whose families originated from 
Turkey may not wish to be identified as part of 
a diaspora. They may feel themselves to be Ger-
man; or they may hold a diasporic identity based 
on their opposition to the homeland’s state or 
regime, rather than support for it. This has his-
torically been the case with overseas populations 
that have connections to Turkey but identify pri-
marily as Kurdish, or as members of other ethnic 
or religious minorities, not as Turkish.
A gap may sometimes emerge between the po-
litical demands put forward by diaspora spokes-
people and the preferences of those they purport 
to represent. Overzealous diaspora activists have 
at times distorted the interests of the populations 
they claim to be lobbying for, or even in some cases 
placed them in harm’s way. An example is the case 
of the 1998 attacks on ethnic Chinese in Indonesia 
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following the Asian financial crisis. At that time, 
a global Chinese diaspora, led by activists in the 
United States, mobilized on behalf of their “ethnic 
kin” in Indonesia. The ethnic Chinese population 
in Indonesia, however, resisted these efforts, as-
serting that they considered themselves to be In-
donesian rather than part of a diaspora. Similarly, 
many of those living in Coptic enclaves in Egypt 
or Armenian communities in Turkey may resist or 
resent the political activities of diaspora organiza-
tions operating in North America or Europe. And 
surely many Iraqis do not think highly of the lob-
bying efforts of Iraqi diaspora groups in the United 
States and Europe that made a case for the 2003 
invasion. 
Diaspora politics and forms of “diaspora en-
gagement” can also be used by non-state actors. 
These are classic strategies employed by national-
ist and separatist movements to mobilize material 
and political support for their causes. Conflicts 
in places such as Kosovo, Kashmir, and Sri Lanka 
have seen non-state groups garnering support in 
the diaspora. The Kosovo Liberation Army raised 
significant amounts of money abroad in the 1990s 
via the Homeland Calling Fund, which operated 
largely as an organized diaspora tax. The Libera-
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were similarly 
engaged in fund-raising in the Tamil diaspora in 
Europe, Australia, and North America until they 
suffered a decisive military defeat in Sri Lanka in 
2009. The Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front has 
been instrumental in mobilizing resistance to In-
dian control of Kashmir, especially in the United 
Kingdom, where it was founded and has remained 
politically active in the large Kashmiri diaspora. 
Arguably, even the extremist Islamic State (ISIS) 
has utilized forms of diaspora politics to enhance 
its power by engaging in online identity politics 
and encouraging migration to a religious “home-
land,” its self-proclaimed caliphate in Syria and 
Iraq, as a means of securing material support from 
abroad.
TRANSCENDING BORDERS
What will be the impact of diaspora politics in 
the future? On the one hand, they have the po-
tential to lead to new forms of ethnonationalism 
if political actors see an advantage in mobilizing 
transnational constituencies based on exclusivist 
forms of ethnic, national, or sectarian identities. 
Diaspora engagement policies can be viewed as an 
extension of earlier forms of nation building. Just 
as states have historically utilized the ideology of 
nationalism as a means of securing the loyalty of 
populations within their borders, they are also in-
creasingly trying to tie the loyalties of populations 
living abroad to the state.
But governments are not alone in devising 
nation-building programs aimed at transnational 
constituencies. Some private groups are also en-
gaged in similar activities. For example, Birthright 
Israel is a privately run program that provides free 
trips to Israel for Jewish young people, largely 
from North America, with the aim of enhancing 
their feelings of belonging and attachment to the 
country. The program not only attempts to secure 
the continued support of an existing diaspora but 
also, in effect, creates new constituencies with 
sympathies for Israel that can later form the basis 
of state-linked diaspora policies. Such “globalized 
nation-building” activities form counterpoints 
to other global trends such as a rise in domestic 
multiculturalism, or national migration and citi-
zenship policies that eschew ethnic or national 
criteria.
On the other hand, it may be that the old mod-
el of nation building—even in a new globalized 
form—is simply not adequate for understand-
ing the broader impacts and meaning of diaspora 
politics. Formerly, a common analytical approach 
employed a “triadic” model that included the in-
terests and characteristics of a “homeland,” a “host 
land,” and the “diaspora.” But this model never 
adequately captured the complexity and diversity 
of diaspora politics. 
New factors such as the rise of the Internet and 
social media have fundamentally transformed the 
broader environment in which politics take place. 
Heightened levels of global connectivity and the 
ability to interact instantaneously and in real 
time have led to new types of transnational con-
nections and politics. In this context, diaspora 
politics can be viewed as not only enhancing or 
challenging state power in particular cases, but 
also contributing to new forms of global identity 
politics that transcend state institutions and in-
habit “non-national” spaces, such as cyberspace 
or global cities.
Cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Paris, and 
London are important spaces of diaspora politics 
that transcend national boundaries. These global 
cities act as nodes in broader diasporic identity 
networks, becoming sites for coordinated forms 
of transnational politics such as global solidar-
ity campaigns around significant political events. 
In the spring of 2009, for example, thousands of 
Tamil diaspora members took part in coordinat-
ed protests around the world alleging that the Sri 
Lankan government was committing war crimes, 
with events in Paris, New York, Washington, Syd-
ney, Melbourne, Geneva, Berlin, Zurich, Oslo, Co-
penhagen, The Hague, and elsewhere. Similarly, 
during the battle for the Syrian town of Kobane 
in 2014, when it was besieged by ISIS, Kurdish 
groups in European cities such as London, Paris, 
and Düsseldorf staged street protests in support of 
Kurdish fighters defending the town.
The emergence of cyberspace as a new arena for 
political interaction also has the potential to cre-
ate broader shifts in political consciousness and 
identity, allowing people to participate in a global 
“marketplace” of identities that exist beyond state 
control and to recreate national identities and in-
stitutions in a virtual form. Examples include the 
emergence of a “Virtual Tamil Eelam” in the wake 
of the LTTE’s 2009 defeat, or online forums that re-
create traditional institutions such as the Sikh lan-
gar, a temple kitchen serving free communal meals, 
as virtual gathering spaces.
In these respects, the “world of diasporas” 
may ultimately challenge many aspects of state- 
centric models of politics. The networked struc-
ture of diasporas means that they are ideally situ-
ated to inhabit new “non-national” political spac-
es such as global cities and cyberspace. Although 
states and other actors will have the motivation 
to continue to shape and harness the power of 
diasporas, the real impact of diaspora politics 
may ultimately be as a harbinger of new forms of 
global identity politics—politics that are shaped 
by but also transcend the limits and institutions 
of states. !
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